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ABSTRACT 
The international development community has been grappling with how to overcome 
challenges in the implementation of development programs and, consequently, with the 
design of practical models and approaches that can assist in delivering on program 
objectives. This paper contributes to the emerging discussion around the development 
of a “science of delivery” by presenting one proven approach - Leadership for Results 
(L4R) – that supports leadership and implementation to improve service delivery in de-
veloping countries. The engagement documented in Burundi provides practical experi-
ence that exemplifies what it means to tackle development through ‘problem driven it-
erative adaptation’ (PDIA).1 This sustained leadership capacity development program, 
supported with close engagement at the implementation levels, has facilitated the gov-
ernment’s own home-grown efforts to lead and manage the reform of their public sec-
tor. The outcome is that the government is now better enabled to hasten the process of 
developing its own implementation capacity over the long-term. 
Keywords - Burundi, Capacity Development, Change Management, Implementation 
Challenges, Leadership, Problem Driven Iterative Adaptation, Public Sector Reform, 
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INTRODUCTION 
In a seminal piece on capacity building and development, Pritchett, Woolcock and An-
drews (2013) make a compelling case regarding the persistence of weak capacity among 
developing countries despite decades of institutional and policy reform efforts support-
ed by billions of dollars in concessionary loans and donor assistance. Their argument 
can be summarized in the following way. The international logic of development the 
past fifty or so years induces (a) developing country governments to engage in what 
they call isomorphic mimicry and (b) multilateral financial institutions and donor coun-
tries to encourage the practice of such mimicry. Isomorphic mimicry, simply put, is the 
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adoption of practices proven to have worked in more well developed or advanced set-
tings without the concomitant development of capabilities necessary to make those 
practices work in a new setting. Developing country governments seek legitimacy for 
their development programs. What better way to “persuade” the citizenry that their pro-
grams have been proven to work well in more advanced countries so by adopting them, 
“we will be able to hasten the pace of our own development.” Donor countries on the 
other hand can claim to their constituents that their aid is enabling poorer countries to 
“follow in their footsteps” and thus become more developed. The incentives work beau-
tifully to propagate a sustained process of institutional transplantation. There are hun-
dreds of examples of this littered throughout the developing world. . . . budget systems 
that work well in the OECD being transplanted to poor Africa countries. . . . solid waste 
management practices in modern urban settings being used as the gold standard by rap-
idly growing cities in Asia. . . . Weberian meritocratic civil service adapted to former 
colonies . . . elections and “competitive” campaign finance foisted on nascent democra-
cies. . . etc. 
But the experience to date suggests that this model of “Big Development”2 has rarely 
produced real development, where poor countries are able to develop the capacity to get 
things done and move programs forward. In those rare instances where a poor country 
has managed to advance rapidly and develop the requisite capacity, the government 
pursued policies and institutional reforms that often ran orthogonal to the above logic, 
with programs anchored on home-grown approaches.
3
 e.g. South Korea (see Amsden, 
Haggard), Japan (see Johnson), Taiwan, China (see Wade). 
The flaw in “Big Development” is that, for the most part, it has neglected the challenges 
of implementation. Donors and Multi-lateral Financial Institutions (MFIs) have excelled 
at providing developing country governments with excellent in-depth diagnostics of 
gaps and weaknesses in a given sector or area and in offering a menu of “good practic-
es” from elsewhere that could fill those gaps. Thousands of trees have been felled to 
produce the paper needed for these analyses/reports. These are of course good and nec-
essary. But they largely underestimate the most challenging aspect, implementation: 
how do you move in a sustained manner from the status quo (where there are big gaps) 
to an expected better state (where some of the gaps are filled). The presumption often 
made is that, with sufficient technical training (and hardware) in a proposed new ap-
proach or methodology, the government will be able to engineer and manage this move. 
But, again as Pritchett et al suggest, this rarely happens. The challenges that confront 
governments in implementing a new initiative go far beyond technical issues, and often 
times, the underlying non-technical challenges are the most daunting – and government 
officials and other stakeholders often do not have the skills and tools to deal with these 
challenges. Not surprising, implementation falters and the program fails to meet its ob-
jectives. Implementation has been the Achilles heel of Big Development. 
The development community is only beginning to grapple with the issue and challenges 
of implementing development programs. The World Bank for instance is refocusing its 
efforts towards developing a so-called “science of delivery” for development programs, 
which at its core is about developing a better understanding of handling, as well as con-
comitant practical approaches for, overcoming implementation hurdles towards attain-
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ing program objectives.
4
 This paper hopes to contribute to this emerging discussion. It 
presents an approach to implementation and service delivery – Leadership for Results 
(L4R)
5
 -- that offers a path (and certainly not the only one) towards helping developing 
countries address implementation challenges. The insights are based on several years of 
experience developing and refining an approach to support the efforts of the Govern-
ment of Burundi in developing the capacity to deliver basic public services.
6
 From the 
lens of Big Development, Burundi is by no means a so-called star performer and, as 
Pritchett et al would argue, it will take the country a long time to reach the capability 
levels of Denmark. But, from the perspective of making progress towards developing 
the capacity to deliver basic services, it certainly has made significant in-roads and is in 
many ways exemplifying what it means to tackle development through problem driven 
iterative adaptation (PDIA).
7
 And the hope is that, through its home grown efforts, the 
country will be able to hasten the process of developing its own implementation capaci-
ty and ultimately “bend the arc of history” by reducing poverty much quicker, i.e. reach 
middle income status in less time it would take via “Big” Development. 
There are two fundamental insights drawn from the Burundi experience and which un-
derpin the basic philosophy of the approach. First, a results-focused process of learning 
through disciplined experimentation enables local officials and stakeholders (including 
skeptics) to more willingly learn and adopt new ways of doing things, i.e. shift behavior 
and mindsets. Second, by consistently producing small tangible results that build on 
each other, the process induces key decision makers to create and sustain the authoriz-
ing environment needed to enable operational teams (those who actually do the work) to 
conduct the disciplined experiments through which learning what works and what does 
not can take place, i.e. in the language of the economist, it creates a politically incentive 
compatible mechanism. Both are essential for change (and thus development) to emerge 
organically. These insights and the rich experience from which they have been drawn 
have helped shape the L4R and define its constituent elements. 
The paper is structured in four parts. Section one provides a brief historical background 
on Burundi as a post conflict state and presents the state of service delivery in 2006 
when the L4R (as itself an experiment) was first broached to the Government. Section 
two presents an analytic narrative of the sequence and logic of events and milestones 
that demonstrate the growing capacity of the public sector in Burundi to deliver basic 
services.
8
 Section three then extracts from the Burundi experience the elements of an 
approach to capacity building in developing countries – Leadership for Results (L4R) – 
that can be adapted flexibly to different contexts. Section four concludes with implica-
tions for the development of a “science of delivery” for development programs. 
FROM CIVIL WAR TO POST-CONFLICT STATE 
Civil war broke out in Burundi in 1993 and raged for 12 years until 2005. A long-
running peace process involved the signing of a peace and reconciliation accord in 
2000, and the establishment of a transition government and parliament in 2002. A new 
constitution was approved in a national referendum in February 2005, and Burundians 
voted in July 2005 in the first parliamentary elections held since the outbreak of the 
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civil war. Mr. Pierre Nkurunziza, leader of the former rebel movement, was elected the 
new President by the Parliament and sworn into office in August 2005. 
However, despite these promising circumstances, the new President inherited a country 
with huge institutional, financial, political, security and service delivery challenges left 
over from the civil war. For example, in the education sector, a serious loss of infra-
structure (school buildings) as well as the collapse of provision networks for education-
al materials and equipment, such as the delivery of textbooks, was greatly hampering 
formal child education. Desertion of students from their schools due to insecurity (in 
1992, 650,000 children were in school, yet by 1994 this had dropped to 440,000
9
), as 
well as death and departure of teachers compounded lack of infrastructure and materi-
als. In the academic year 2005-2006, the student to classroom ratio was 87:1, and the 
ratio of math textbooks to student was 20:1
10
. All of these factors, and more, evidenced 
insufficient service delivery in education. 
 Given the high rate of turnover at the vice-presidential and ministerial level, coupled 
with the fact that many Cabinet members and senior decision-makers in the newly con-
stituted government were relatively inexperienced in professional government roles, the 
capacity of the public sector to act and absorb the large in-flows of money to the newly 
post-conflict environment and generate results from this was a matter of concern for 
government, the donor community, and the citizenry. Emphasis was therefore placed on 
the need for an intensive and sustained process of capacity building to enable the public 
sector to perform its functions. Delivering on the pledges of the President in the new 
five-year plan was of utmost importance to security and development in this post-
conflict, delicate power structure. The elected government needed to demonstrate suc-
cess in priority areas, deliver needed services to citizens and gain political capital and 
trust from all to support the process of establishing stability and security in the country. 
Organic Capacity Building: 2006 - present 
In early 2006, at the request of the World Bank’s Representative Office in Bujumbura,11 
a small team from the World Bank Institute (WBI) visited Burundi and engaged gov-
ernment officials in a discussion of the potential for initiating a leadership development 
program. This program would aim to support the government strengthen the capacities 
of the country’s leaders to drive change at the institutional level and accelerate the im-
plementation of national programs aimed at delivering results to benefit the population 
and the country at large. At the request of the government, a WBI-supported leadership 
development program was then initiated in the spring of 2006 and aimed to meet de-
mands for capacity development amongst a range of stakeholders at the local and na-
tional levels of leadership, as well as across government, civil society and the private 
sector. 
In collaboration with the government, this program was designed on an implicit theory 
of change: Small initiatives would be launched to demonstrate the possibility of produc-
ing quick, tangible, and meaningful results; an in-country Cabinet retreat would be con-
vened to showcase these results and generate political support/buy-in for expanding the 
program; continuous cycles of expanded initiatives and corresponding Cabinet retreats 
would sustain a process of capacity building over time. The Cabinet retreats would aim 
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to bring together government ministers and other senior officials to coalesce around 
identified challenges and determine a vision to overcome them. Pilot initiatives and fol-
low-up on implementation of decisions reached at these retreats were to be supported 
through the Rapid Results Approach (RRA). The RRA was introduced as a methodolo-
gy that would be applied to jump-start and accelerate project implementation in line 
with the vision and priorities established during the retreats. 
The RRA was developed circa 1960 by Schaffer Consulting for private sector compa-
nies in the United States to enable them to quickly tackle and overcome hurdles towards 
attaining a project’s goal.12 It is a methodology anchored on good project management 
techniques, and it implements Rapid Results Initiatives (RRIs) - “small projects de-
signed to quickly deliver mini-versions of the big project’s end results”13 in around 100 
days – to work towards achieving the broad, overarching end-goal. The RRA was more 
recently, circa 2007, formally adapted by the Rapid Results Institute to support devel-
opment projects of developing country governments in overcoming constraints to pro-
ject implementation. Through learning by doing, Rapid Results practitioners including 
those from WBI and the Rapid Results Institute recognized the value of ensconcing the 
RRI within the broader framework of results based management (RBM). RBM lays out 
a results based chain for a program or project; the RRI then becomes the implementa-
tion instrument to drive the attainment of milestones, outputs, and intermediate out-
comes towards attaining the goals of the project (see Annex 1 for a detailed descrip-
tion). 
At this point, the Government had not heard of the RRA and was naturally skeptical of 
what it could do to help build its capacity to deliver basic services. But given its desire 
to get things moving, it agreed to conduct two small RRI pilots to assess the potential of 
this approach for tackling the challenges of implementing service delivery. In May 
2006, a Steering Committee headed by the Second Vice-President was formed to decide 
in which areas to conduct the pilots and to provide political cover for their implementa-
tion. In late 2006, a decision was made to conduct two pilots, the first in the education 
sector and the second in the health sector.  
In the first, one of the pressing concerns of the Ministry of Education (MOE) was the 
long delay in getting primary school textbooks to village schools, which typically took 
one year.
14
 The Director General of Education proposed to conduct an RRI in the prov-
ince of Bubanza and committed to the Steering Committee that her team would reduce 
this delay to within 100 days in the province. The team in fact successfully delivered 
25,000 textbooks within 60 days, well within the 100-day target of the RRI. In the sec-
ond, the Ministry of Health (MOH) successfully increased the number of HIV/AIDs 
screenings of pregnant women in the pilot health care center from an average of 71 per 
month to 482 in the first month, more than a six-fold increase.
15
 While these pilots were 
miniscule in the whole scheme of things, they enabled the respective teams to learn 
what works and what does not in attaining key service delivery priorities, involving the 
complete chain of actors required for implementation – textbook delivery in the case of 
education and HIV/AIDs screening of pregnant women in the case of health. The pilots 
demonstrated solutions to overcome long-standing constraints to implementation in two 
priority sectors, jumpstarting results beyond expectations. 
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In May 2007, the MOE and the MOH presented the results of their pilots at a high-level 
Government retreat attended by the President, the two Vice-Presidents, and the Cabinet 
and organized by the Steering Committee. The participants were astonished (and elated) 
that government ministries, which presumably had little or no capacity to get things 
done, managed to successfully tackle seemingly intractable problems. The Second Vice-
President (VP2) proposed that these pilots be scaled up nationwide and that new RRIs 
be initiated in pressing service delivery areas. The President and the Cabinet endorsed 
the proposal and urged the Committee to proceed quickly. The scale-up of the pilots 
was now seen as achievable because the respective RRI teams were able to develop so-
lutions to long standing constraints that hindered implementation. They each learned 
how to address the “pain points” along the delivery chain, collaborating with other 
agencies and stakeholders throughout the process, and could now share this with col-
leagues in other provinces. Moreover, in the process of conducting the pilots, they 
learned team building and collaborative skills that were necessary to make an RRI work. 
They were then able to help advise other teams (not just in their respective ministries) in 
the use of an RRI and, more importantly, in their problem-solving that lead to the intro-
duction of new systems they had devised to be more effective in their work. 
The experience with the pilots ushered a “mindset change” amongst the Cabinet. The 
Council of Ministers was also highly supportive of this program and the Second Vice-
President became the champion for its continuation and expansion. Even more concrete-
ly, in his closing statement at the retreat, the President communicated an unanticipated 
enthusiasm for extending the approach to additional line ministries and in cross-cutting 
areas: “In light of the results from pilot experiences using Rapid Results in health and in 
education in Bubanza, we recommend the application and the scale-up of the approach 
in all sectors of national life and at all levels of decision-making… the approach will 
become a tool for programming, monitoring and evaluation, on a regular basis, the 
actions of the government”.16 Immediately thereafter, the Steering Committee commu-
nicated the results of the pilots widely across various ministries of the public sector and 
engaged the line ministries in selecting five officials from each relevant ministry to par-
ticipate in a training that would enable them to apply the RRA to address constraints in 
their respective service delivery problems. Eight ministries then launched 11 corre-
sponding RRIs. 
One particularly instructive initiative was launched by the Ministry of the Civil Service 
(MCS) in late 2007. A gnawing problem the Ministry faced then was in getting newly 
minted civil servants their first paycheck, i.e. de facto getting them into the public sector 
payroll. The problem was particularly acute for newly recruited primary school teachers 
– it took approximately a year on average for them to receive their very first paycheck. 
This led to a host of problems including absenteeism, as the teachers had to constantly 
come to the provincial capital and the capital city to follow up on “getting into the pay-
roll”, and corruption, as many had to bribe education officials to facilitate the process. 
The Ministry launched an RRI covering six remote provinces in September 2007 and 
the DG of Civil service, supported by her Minister, made a public commitment to re-
duce the payment delay in these provinces to 90 days. This was considered a bold initia-
tive and many in the Cabinet had doubts that the MCS could attain this stretch result. To 
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their surprise, the MCS did accomplish the feat
17
, as attested by the Minister of Civil 
Service, Ms. Annonciata Sendazirasa speaking in 2010: “There was a time in the civil 
service when new teachers did not receive their first pay-checks and worked unpaid 
until between eight months to one year after beginning work. Sometimes we received 
incomplete files from the relevant ministry and sometimes we did not receive a file at 
all. Now we have devised a system that ensures they are paid within two months”. Be-
cause teachers comprised about half the civil service, this had an enormous impact. The 
RRI helped the MCS identify the “pain points” and build capacity of a core team to 
make progress and deliver results. With this increased knowledge and capacity, the 
MCS was then able to design a system to address this problem not just for all new 
teachers but also for other newly minted civil servants
18
 to receive payment within 60 
days. 
With the confidence, knowledge, and capacity built up by the success of the “payroll” 
initiative, the MCS launched two RRIs in October 2008 to reduce the number of ficti-
tious staff within the Civil Service: supporting the completion of the census of civil 
servants and distributing 43,000 cards – one for each civil servant - within 100 days. 
This helped identify those who were on the payroll, but not in active civil service and 
resulted in the suspension of payment of 728 salaries to ‘ghost’ individuals leading to 
monthly savings of approximately 60,000,000 Burundi Francs, reported the Director 
General of the MCS, Ms. Marie-Rosette Nizigiyimana. This is roughly equivalent to US 
$470,000 per annum (equivalent to the annual budget of the Ministry of Commerce) – a 
significant saving for a severely cash-strapped government budget. 
From mid-2007 throughout 2008, the Government launched numerous RRIs involving 
many ministries, including the above examples, and, in March 2009, it held a second 
high-level retreat, facilitated by WBI, to review the results of these cycles of initiatives. 
Over that time, RRIs broadly speaking had been used to institute mechanisms geared 
towards enhancing transparency and accountability within ministries and within the 
government as a whole. They had helped to reduce processes and increase awareness on 
the demand side. For example, in addition to the more expedient processing of payment 
of new civil servants, there was increased effectiveness and transparency in the Ministry 
of Justice through a reduction in the time it takes for copies of judgments to be made 
available from four days to just one day. And in the Ministry of Energy, Water and 
Mining there was a reduction in the period of time taken between invoicing and collec-
tion, and an increase in collection rate of charges for drinking water from beneficiaries 
in rural areas (33 areas) from 12% to 80% of those serviced. 
Having results such as these presented at the retreat by ministries implementing RRIs 
provided the leadership with context and an evidence-base for informed decision-
making and strategic planning about next steps. This was particularly important in light 
of the evolving priorities of the government two years on from the previous high-level 
leadership retreat, which was held in a very recently reached post-conflict context. The 
country had, over that time, largely progressed to a more stable development environ-
ment and national priorities were evolving in alignment with that. 
This retreat also provided an opportunity to consider the extent to which the initial ca-
pacity development and learning goals had been reached, particularly in terms of project 
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implementation and management. An additional key outcome of this retreat from the 
President and the Cabinet, who were encouraged by the broadened set of results across 
more ministries, was their endorsement of a decree (that was ultimately signed by the 
two Vice-Presidents in July 2009) to institutionalize the RRA as the preferred method 
for meeting the objectives of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP). The decree 
required each ministry to launch RRIs each trimester to make progress in meeting their 
respective sector priorities.
19
 Emerging from the discussions and agreements during the 
second leadership retreat on new national priorities, multiple RRIs were launched in 17 
of the 21 ministries of the government. 
In continuing to facilitate bridging the gap between implementation (the operational 
level) and the leadership level, a third governmental cabinet retreat was held in March 
2011 to review the results emanating from the additional cycles of RRIs conducted 
since the second retreat in 2009 and to launch the application of the new World Bank 
strategy for Africa 2011
20
 in Burundi. This forum was an opportunity to review and 
strategize going forward with the new Cabinet members selected following recent na-
tional elections in 2010. Session discussions focused on identifying potential solutions 
and designing action plans to confront challenges surrounding the evolving three priori-
ty areas of concern to the government at the time (then five years on since the formal 
end to the civil war): (i) economic growth, (ii) public finance and fiscal space, and (iii) 
good governance
21
 (which were directly aligned with three themes of the World Bank 
Africa Strategy of 2011).
22
 These areas highlighted the need to further strengthen the 
delivery capability of the public sector. Following a request from the President
23
, multi-
ple RRIs were again launched to translate into action the recommendations emerging 
from this retreat. 
Of concern to the Cabinet throughout 2011, was the dismal ranking of Burundi on the 
World Bank Group’s Doing Business Indicators (its DB 2011 ranking was 177 of 
183)
24
: it wanted to undertake concrete initiatives that would help the country improve 
its rankings. One indicator was ‘Getting Electricity’ and so, building upon previous ef-
forts since 2009 to improve the service delivery of water and electricity as mentioned 
above, an RRI was launched to increase the rate at which new clients were connected to 
the national electric grid. The RRI introduced a streamlined approach whereby clients 
make just one payment at the time of connection (rather than an application fee and later 
a connection fee), reducing administrative requirements and processing time for the 
responsible agency. Consequently, delays in connection times, which had previously 
been three months, were reduced to a more reasonable wait time of two months. With 
the results from this successful REGIDESO
25
 initiative in early 2011, supported by the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC), Burundi managed to improve its Doing Busi-
ness ranking from 177 in 2011 to 169
26
 in 2012 and featured among the top 10 econo-
mies that improved the most worldwide on the ease of doing business in 2010/2011.
27
 
The DB Indicators cover not only ‘Getting Electricity’ but also indicators relating to 
warehouses more broadly, including construction permits and connection to utilities 
other than electricity – such as water. Drawing on the innovations and learning from the 
RRI piloted on connecting electricity, a subsequent RRI was launched by the same 
REGIDESO unit in June 2011 to expand this success to include their work on connect-
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ing clients to the water supply. This initiative led to a reduction in connection time to 
both water and electricity supplies in the capital city, Bujumbura, from 3 months to 1 
month. By December 2011, this RRI team reported to have shown improvements in 
connection rates: of the 2,092 new requests for connection in the months of June, July 
and August, the team managed to process and connect all these, whereas in the period 
March, April, May, they had connected only 1347 out of 2052 requests.
28
 
Another priority of the Cabinet was preparing for action on the National Strategy for 
Good Governance and Anti-Corruption that was adopted in September 2011. One im-
portant aspect of the good governance strategy was to reduce waste in government ex-
penditure. And all ministries were tasked with improving the efficiency of expenditures. 
RRIs were launched in March 2011 to help achieve this objective. 
In December 2011, the Cabinet held a fourth retreat under the Leadership program 
(opened by the President, chaired by the Second Vice-President, and closed by the First 
Vice-President) to review action on this most recent cycle of RRIs and strategize on 
evolving government priorities relating to Doing Business and good governance. During 
this retreat, the government heard evidence, from ministry teams and reviewed results 
from the numerous RRIs conducted over the course of the year. For example, Mr. Bon-
aventure Ndikumana (Ministry of East Africa Community Affairs) noted: “Before the 
launch of the RRI, in March 2011, this department spent 750,000 Burundi Francs per 
month on electricity, by July 2011 (100 days later) this had been reduced to 500,000 
Francs, and by November (another 100 days later) this had been reduced again to 
436,250 Francs – meaning a 41.8% reduction on electricity used, and savings for the 
department of 313,750 Francs” for the same level of productivity as previous to the 
RRI.
29
 Efforts to reduce waste in government expenditure was seen more broadly across 
other ministries, for example, General Major Ntirantibagira of the Ministry of National 
Defense and Ex-Combatants reported the ministry had reduced its consumption of fuel 
from 210,000 liters in May 2011 to 150,000 liters in September 2011 without affecting 
its productivity.
30
 
As exemplified, the results proved encouraging and the Cabinet expressed they would 
be continuing throughout 2012 with the L4R model for prioritizing, decision-making 
and implementing government-wide initiatives with a particular focus on improving 
governance, reducing corruption and improving the business climate to attract private 
investments. 
The purpose of this temporal narrative (2006 – 2012) has been to illustrate how Burundi 
has been gradually and successfully improving the capacity of its public sector to deliv-
er basic services since transitioning to a post-conflict state. Progress has been sustained 
through an organic learning by doing process anchored on repeated and expanded im-
plementation of RRIs. Figure 1 below succinctly captures the progress of this learning 
process: the number of RRIs undertaken rose from 2 in 2006 to, cumulatively, 246 RRIs 
by 2012; Figure 2 below shows that in 2006, only 2 ministries were willing to engage in 
RRIs but by 2010 all had implemented RRIs. Annex 2 provides evidence that these 
RRIs have indeed produced tangible results; and, more important, Annex 3 provides 
indications that the RRIs have become more challenging over time, suggesting that the 
public sector is improving its capability to tackle implementation.
31
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Figure 1: Cumulative Number of RRIs implemented between 2006-2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Percentage of ministries implementing RRIs between 2006 and 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Indeed, in isolation, an RRI appears to be a very minor blimp in the screen. But when 
viewed chronologically and globally, RRIs paint a compelling picture of burgeoning 
capacity. 
The key point to make is that Burundi has begun to build its public sector on its own 
terms through what Andrews (2012) calls problem driven iterative adaptation (PDIA). 
Undoubtedly, it will take a long time for the country to become a Singapore and it will 
confront many bumps along the way. But, because it has adopted a PDIA approach to 
building capacity, it now seems capable of escaping the dreaded “capability trap.” One 
might thus consider Burundi’s experience to date a “preliminary test” of the PDIA hy-
pothesis as laid out by Andrews et al (2012). 
LEARNING FROM BURUNDI 
The biggest challenge that any new Government faces is how to deliver results that mat-
ter to citizens. This challenge is particularly acute in poor countries where capacity of 
the public sector is considerably weak. Governments often despair because of the enor-
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mity of the problems they face in overcoming this challenge. Burundi’s experience to 
date suggests that there is a way out of this seemingly hopeless labyrinth. In this section, 
we lay out an approach to capacity building that grew out of the World Bank Institute’s 
continued engagement with the Government of Burundi and which matured into what 
has been called the Leadership for Results (L4R) program. A distinctive feature of this 
approach is its focus on creating what economists might call a politically incentive 
compatible mechanism. 
Creating the Authorizing Environment: Pilots and Knowledge Exchange 
As noted above, the post conflict Government of Burundi had to quickly come to terms 
with the need to deliver on its promises – delivery of basic services particularly in edu-
cation and health -- in order to keep the country from sliding back into conflict. Hence, 
it was open to options on how it could begin to do this and “get some action going.” The 
first hurdle WBI confronted was how to overcome the skepticism of Government on the 
use of the RRA as a way of delivering tangible results quickly. To address this concern, 
the WBI offered to conduct pilots to demonstrate the potential of the approach. The suc-
cess of the pilots – in terms of delivering results (albeit miniscule in the larger scheme 
of things) – was enough to convince key decision makers to expand the approach within 
the ministries that conducted the pilots and to try it in other ministries. 
The next hurdle was to convince a larger cadre of decision makers, in this case the Cab-
inet, of the potential of the RRA to help their respective agencies meet the challenge of 
delivering services. To address this, the President and his two Vice-Presidents con-
vened, and WBI facilitated, a Cabinet wide retreat during which the results of the two 
pilots were presented. Officials and practitioners from other African countries who had 
been engaged in RRA supported programs or faced critical implementation challenges 
also shared their experiences with the RRA. This retreat was thus in part a knowledge 
exchange event designed to give participants a good sense of the pros and cons and the 
potential benefits of the RRA. The knowledge exchange in turn was used to get “buy 
in” from senior decision makers and bring consensus among them on priority areas 
where the RRA could be used to improve service delivery. Conceptually then, 
knowledge exchange was de facto used as an instrument to help create the authorizing 
environment to launch the RRA and conduct corresponding RRIs. 
Why “Small Development” Matters for getting to “Big Development” 
In the development field, we often hear donors and experts lament about the “lack of 
political will” and the concomitant failure of development programs to meet their objec-
tives, particularly those involving institutional reform. The implicit assumption is that 
one needs to wait for political will to “appear” before any real change can take place. 
But, in fact, political will can be engendered. It is not some exogenous factor over 
which one has little or no influence. What the Burundians learned was that it can be 
created and increased. 
For politicians and senior decision makers, results are precious political assets. If they 
can claim credit for a result (even partial) that benefits citizens they enhance the chances 
of maintaining their current positions, whether as an elected, appointed, or career offi-
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cial.
32
 But most decision makers tend to be risk averse and so are rarely enthused by the 
prospects of a promising development program whose results will materialize only after 
several years. The challenge then is how to produce tangible results within a short time 
horizon that build momentum towards a longer-term goal. For a newly elected mayor of 
a city who must run for re-election in three years, this horizon translates into a year or a 
year and a half at most as he or she must start campaigning by the third year. For a min-
ister of health, it could be as short as a year. For a new head of state winning a hotly 
contested election by a sliver, it could be the length of a honeymoon period. So for 
many decision makers, there is an incompatibility between the promise of a program 
and their political interests. The key then is how to address this. 
As the Burundi experience illustrates, the RRA offers decision makers an instrument for 
bridging the time gap between their interests and the longer-term impact of a develop-
ment program. Through an RRI, the risk of failure is reduced considerably – what is the 
worst that can happen in a 100 days? But if implemented effectively, it produces tangi-
ble results that a decision maker can point to (and claim credit for) and demonstrates 
how tangible results can be achieved systematically on a wider scale (and which mini-
mizes risk), i.e. it helps the decision maker meet his or her delivery “score card” and, for 
politicians, enhance their re-electability. This creates incentives to consider the RRA 
and support the conduct of RRIs. 
Following the completion of two pilot RRIs in health and education, this is in fact what 
we observed happened during the first Cabinet retreat (2007) organized by the Steering 
Committee. Due to the demonstration effect of successes created from these pilots, the 
Cabinet became energized and sanctioned a first round of eleven new RRIs that were 
launched in eight different ministries in October 2007 and underwent final review in 
February 2008. In 2009, a second Cabinet retreat was held to review the results of these 
rounds of RRIs that had been implemented to translate into action the recommendations 
emerging from the first retreat and, given the success of many of these initiatives, au-
thorized additional rounds of RRIs going forward that would support implementation of 
the evolving priorities of the government at that time. In fact, in July 2009, the two 
Vice-Presidents issued a decree declaring the RRA as the approach of choice for im-
plementing development programs. In March 2011, a third Cabinet retreat was orga-
nized to launch the application of the World Bank new strategy for Africa to Burundi 
and present results of RRIs to a newly elected government and cabinet members, and 
gain their buy-in for sustaining the leadership development program. The new leader-
ship was convinced and supported a renewed round of RRIs; a fourth retreat was held in 
December 2011, timed to tackle urgency around private sector investments (measured 
by Doing Business indicators and rankings) and good governance strategies. In sum, the 
authorizing environment over the past six years has been sustained through an inter play 
of RRIs and Cabinet retreats, with the former providing the fuel for and the latter the 
keys to the engine. Political will, which is crucial to the success of any development 
program, emerged out of and has been fortified with this interplay. 
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The Role of a Rapid Results Initiative 
The RRI is the molecule that has driven the political dynamic of capacity building in 
Burundi. While there have been numerous articles written on it and its utility,
33
 it is not 
well understood as an instrument for fueling change, which at its core is what capacity 
building is about: how to shift the mindsets of people and induce them to do things dif-
ferently. While seemingly simple in its structure, it is complex in its implementation. 
An RRI is a process divided into three phases. It starts with what is called a shaping 
phase. This begins with preparatory work with the leadership (political sponsors and 
strategic leaders) on identifying core, priority areas to which an RRI team may contrib-
ute their efforts and act in alignment towards supporting the achievement of a broader 
strategy, policy or overarching development goal. Typically, a political sponsor (who is 
a high-level official) provides overall institutional support for the RRIs. For example, in 
the case of Burundi, a Minister sponsoring RRIs within his/her ministry, and the Lead-
ership Steering Committee created to oversee and guide the overall portfolio of RRIs 
across the government. A strategic leader (for example the permanent secretary of the 
relevant ministry) is designated and his/her role is to keep the team focused on its 
“stretch” result (see below) and assist in unblocking constraints to achieving it. A ‘chal-
lenge note’ is signed by the strategic leader to set a strategic level goal and to help the 
implementing team to hold their leaders accountable to their commitments and to other 
ministries whose work may rely upon the success of the RRI. An RRI team leader is 
selected to coordinate the tasks of the team members and problem solve on a day-to-day 
basis. A core team is then identified with members carefully selected after extensive 
discussions with relevant parties (which could involve several ministries, agencies, units 
within these, CSOs, and/or relevant private sector groups). A key selection principle is 
that the team must include someone from any group that is critical to the successful im-
plementation of the initiative
34
 (which could include skeptics and potential detractors). 
The team then begins the second phase: the implementation phase. The core team is 
formed, based on identification by the strategic and team leaders, and they start the 
launch session, during which the team debates and agrees on the stretch result that is to 
be achieved within a hundred days (or less). The result must be measurable, achievable 
within the hundred days, but ambitious and outside the team’s comfort zone – hence the 
term “stretch”. The team then prepares a detailed action plan with the understanding that 
things may need to be changed midway. Roles and accountabilities are then assigned to 
each member of the team so that it is clear who is responsible for what at each point in 
the process. 
Mid-way through the implementation process, the team conducts a mid-term review 
during which progress to date is discussed, e.g. have the relevant milestones been 
reached and, if not, why. If there is a need to alter things and change direction, the rest 
of the action plan is revised accordingly. At the end of the 100 days implementation, a 
final review is held with the relevant decision makers, which concludes with a public 
celebration of success that gives kudos and renewed motivation to the RRI teams. In-
sights gained from this final review session are used to frame the third phase: planning 
for sustainability. At this point, discussion on the plans for sustaining these results takes 
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place. Also considered at this time are the opportunities for potential scale-up – includ-
ing next steps in terms of either geographical expansion (beyond the pilot area/province) 
or sectoral expansion (to seek to extend these results and gains in other sectors of the 
government). 
This process looks deceivingly simple. But it is challenging to implement. The underly-
ing thrust of an RRI is to help the team members discover what works and what does 
not through a learning-by-doing process. As the team proceeds with the work, their per-
spective gradually changes because they see in real time what is possible. They also 
learn to appreciate the importance of collaboration and acquire skills in fostering it – 
because they have to work together to attain their targets. At the end of the process, 
team members will have developed more confidence in their ability to make things hap-
pen and get things done. An RRI team member within REGIDESO, Mr. Thierry 
Ngezahindavyi described how “the RRI structure really helped them work together as 
co-workers, rather than working through a hierarchy, speeding up the process of taking 
action, and learning quickly from our efforts”. Likewise, Mr. Isaac Nzitunga in the Min-
istry of Agriculture tells how this L4R and the RRI structure helped “leadership en-
gagement from the top [the minister] right down to the base [even in decentralized prov-
inces] encouraged a ‘spirit of results’ and mobilized people from all areas [the govern-
ment administration as well as the local citizens] to work together to achieve what they 
wanted.” 35 
For all these to materialize however, a seasoned RRA coach is needed to “accompany 
the team in its journey.” The role of the coach36 is to help team members discover (a) 
what works and what does not and (b) what hidden capabilities they might have in ad-
dressing constraints and the like to making progress. So a coach is very different from 
an expert. The latter teaches primarily through manuals, lectures, workshops, and the 
like. A coach teaches through self-discovery. And this requires special skills that are 
acquired through a combination of training and field experience. Typically, the longer 
the experience, the more effective the individual is. Table 1 indicates the number of 
coaches trained in Burundi over the six-year period and Annex 4 summarizes the skill 
requirements for a coach. 
Table 1: Table on coaches trained each year from 2006 through 2012.
37
 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
External 
coaches 
+1 +2 +2 +1 +10 
(incl. 
ENA) 
+ 6 
(incl. 
ENA) 
- 
Internal 
coaches 
0 +11 +6 +8 +13 +8 +2 
Sources: Coaches 
One aspect of an RRI that should be fully appreciated for its strategic value is the very 
public celebration that is organized around the final review to which media, beneficiar-
ies, and other stakeholders are invited. The event is designed to acknowledge the RRI 
team(s) for their innovation and success, i.e. providing psychological rewards.
38
 This is 
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important in encouraging behavior change more widely within the relevant organiza-
tions and among stakeholders. But more important and less appreciated is its value as a 
credible commitment mechanism. Often, during these events, ministers, politicians, and 
senior decision makers bask in the success of their respective teams and announce their 
sponsorship of future initiatives (RRIs) to tackle new problems. Because media covers 
the event and often highlights these commitments, their reputations (and political capi-
tal) are put on the line as the coverage and fanfare raise public expectations (as well as 
the expectations of superiors). This creates very strong incentives for them to monitor 
the progress of the new RRIs. 
The close attention that a sponsor, e.g. a minister, gives to an RRI generates a “sense of 
urgency” and a fear of failure among RRI team members which boosts their adrenalin 
and encourages them to take personal accountability for their designated tasks and to 
work collaboratively to achieve their stretch result. Moreover, when the task is finally 
done, it gives team members great pride in their accomplishment. In other words, an 
RRI is not just another task to be completed in a long list of “to do’s.” It embodies so-
called “zest” (invisible) factors that add spice and tang to an otherwise commonplace 
meal, turning it into a memorable experience that ultimately changes the attitude of 
leaders and team members towards risk and change.
39
 The DG in the Ministry of Civil 
Service explained how through the RRI process “with a little effort, we changed our 
way of thinking and working to achieve more with the same resources… by increasing 
motivation through our urgent focus on the RRI objective within a strict, short time-
line… and by working inter-ministerially, and more closely with leaders… and by hav-
ing support of an external coach we succeeded”.40 
Measuring Efficacy and Cost Efficiency of the L4R Model 
One question that arises at this point is how to assess the efficacy and cost efficiency of 
the approach – the Leadership for Results (L4R) program. There has been an initial at-
tempt at addressing the first, employing an assessment methodology called Outcome 
Harvesting/Mapping.
41
 This methodology identifies links between the many different 
interventions, large and small, undertaken during an RRA process and establishes a log-
ical path of how interventions have led to intermediate results and those results have led 
to further interventions and results down the line. The story line is then substantiated 
with third parties who were privy and witness to the various interventions. What emerg-
es is a plausible assessment that attributes the results to the interventions. More will of 
course need to be done on this aspect. 
42
 
The issue of cost efficiency of the approach has not been evaluated. But what is evident 
from the limited experience with the L4R is that very little resources outside of client 
staff time are needed for its implementation.
43
 Most of the work revolves around learn-
ing by doing by client teams on problems that they would have had to address in any 
case. A small team of persons (ranging from two to four staff and consultant(s) depend-
ing on the needs) and a local, in-country RRA coach are all that are needed to support a 
program.
44
 These non-staff time costs are considerably lower than the cost of many con-
sultant-supported technical assistance programs.
45
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CONCLUSIONS 
There is increasing disappointment among multilateral development institutions, donor 
agencies, and developing country governments in the progress over the long term to-
wards reducing poverty and sustaining economic growth, particularly among the 
world’s poorest countries. Despite billions in aid, many developing countries still strug-
gle to win the race against poverty.
46
 As Pritchett et al (2012) argue, a major contrib-
uting factor to this conundrum has been the lack of attention to building the capability 
of government and non-government actors to implement development programs. Im-
plementation is assumed to be something government and non-government actors must 
learn on their own and that they will eventually manage to figure out how to address 
implementation challenges. The experience and evidence to date suggests otherwise. 
Recognizing this gap, a number of international development organizations have begun 
to turn their attention to helping their client countries deliver results through improving 
their capacity to tackle implementation challenges.
47
 The “How” of development is fi-
nally, albeit slowly, getting much needed attention. This paper has attempted to contrib-
ute to the emerging discussion and debate. Through the lens of Burundi’s s experience 
since transitioning to a post conflict state, it presents a practical approach for developing 
home grown implementation skills within the public sector over the long term, an ap-
proach that recognizes the importance of aligning the skills building process with politi-
cal incentives and that operationalizes the concept of PDIA. And it demonstrates how so 
called “Small” Development efforts can be translated into larger scale impact.48 
The World Bank is embarking on a significant change process that will reorient the or-
ganization’s engagement with its client countries towards assistance in problem solving 
(which may or may not involve lending). At the heart of this change is the development 
of what has been called a “science of delivery” for development programs. Though 
there has been an ongoing debate on exactly what this means, there is agreement that it  
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will involve the application of the scientific method to improving our understanding of 
implementation challenges. 
In recent months efforts have been made around the development and clarification of a 
shared definition of Science of Delivery (SoD). Concretely, it is defined as including 
five components to help increase success in the implementation and delivery of pro-
jects: (i) maintaining a relentless focus on citizen outcomes, defined as measurable wel-
fare gains of citizens; (ii) adopting multi-stakeholder approaches and coalitions for en-
gagement and participation; (iii) using, developing, collecting, contributing evidence to 
define problems, refine solutions, enable ‘course correction’, and support knowledge 
generation; (iv) leadership for change, including incentives to motivate, political econ-
omy drivers of change and facilitating coalition-building, and; (v) adaptive implementa-
tion that allows for iterative experimentation, feedback loops and ‘course correction’. 
This definition has been shaped by the experience of the L4R model as the WBI Lead-
ership Practice has worked in close collaboration with the team within the World Bank 
charged with advancing the work around the development of a Science of Delivery. The 
L4R model – developed from the experience in Burundi - is therefore an example of the 
operationalization of the components elements of the current definition. 
A critical element put into action is the need to capture learning throughout the process 
of project implementation and to respond to it quickly in an iterative and adaptive ap-
proach to implementation. In practice, the short feedback loops of approximately 100 
days within RRIs allow the operational level implementers to review and learn-by-doing 
on a short timeframe in order to be able to adapt and adjust their processes, teams and 
systems to arrive at their desired result. Another component is in leadership and change 
management: the periodic leadership level retreats throughout the project implementa-
tion also allow for feedback loops to bridge the gap between leadership level and opera-
tional level implementers and to help alleviate roadblocks at a political level in order for 
operational staff to keep progressing. It takes into account the political economy and 
incentives affecting actors in the implementation process through discussion with lead-
ership, and public presentation of results to citizenry. It can also help inform decision-
making at a strategic level using practical evidence and data gathered from the RRIs. 
However, this all said, there is an emerging criticism that with a focus on the “science” 
of delivery, it ignores the “art” of delivery, of which politics is so much a part: context 
matters so how will this be addressed.
49
 The L4R begins to respond to this criticism. Art 
is indeed unique but, with guidance and hard work, the skills needed to become an artist 
can be developed. A few individuals will of course have natural talent and will rise to 
become masters. But many can develop good enough skills to become decent artists. 
Change contexts are likewise unique; the skills needed to manage change and thus im-
plementation can be learned. The L4R offers a process that supports and facilitates the 
learning and development of capacities required for successful implementation of com-
plex and adaptive reform processes that aim to improve service delivery to citizens. 
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NOTES 
 
1
  See Andrews et al (2012) for a discussion of the PDIA and Andrews (2013) for its 
relevance to institutional reforms. 
2
  Cohen and Easterly (2009), See Chapter 1, Introduction: Thinking Big versus Think-
ing Small. “The failure of thinking big – elsewhere described as ‘the panaceas that 
failed’ – has been widely acknowledged”. 
3
  See for instance Amsden (1989) and Haggard (1990) on South Korea, Johnson 
(1982) on Japan, Wade (1990) on Taiwan, China.  
4
  See for instance, World Bank (May 2013) 
5
  Since the time of writing, the Leadership for Results (L4R) program has undergone 
reform in the process from its transition within the World Bank Institute Leadership 
Practice to the ‘Leadership, Learning and Innovation’ VPU created in July 2014. The 
program of support itself has evolved based upon learning and experiences from its 
implementation in recent years. The iterated and improved version of the program is 
named Collaborative Leadership for Development (CL4D). 
6
  Since 2011, the approach has been deployed in a number of other developing coun-
tries to support development programs including among others the implementation of 
medium term development plans, performance contracting in the public sector, de-
livery of basic services in post conflict states, water sector reform, agency restructur-
ing. See http://www.lead4dev.org. 
7
  See Andrews et al (2012) for a discussion of the PDIA and Andrews (2013) for its 
relevance to institutional reforms. 
8
  See Bates et al (1998) for the basic idea of an analytic narrative. 
9  
World Bank Institute (2007a)
 
10 
 World Bank Institute (2007b)
 
11
  The World Bank Country Manager at that time, Alassane Sow, was instrumental in 
persuading the Government to engage the World Bank Institute and in providing the 
internal support and encouragement to the team throughout his tenure. Subsequently, 
Mercy Tembon, who succeeded Alassane as Country Manager, enthusiastically sup-
ported the scaling up of the program.  
12
  Matta and Ashkenas (2003). Matta is the President and Founding Board Member 
(2007) of the Rapid Results Institute and a senior partner of Schaffer Consulting, the 
parent for-profit firm of the not-for-profit Institute. Schaffer introduced the RRA in 
1960 to the private sector. 
13
  See Matta and Ashkenas (2003). 
14
  In the context of the RRA, a reduction in the delay in delivering textbooks nation-
wide would constitute the project. An intermediate outcome of this project would be 
reducing this delay to within 100 days in Bubanza. An RRI is then launched to attain 
this intermediate outcome.  
15
  See World Bank Institute (2013). 
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16
  President Pierre Nkurunziza, 4
th
 May 2007, Closing remarks of Government Retreat, 
Bujumbura 
17  
World Bank (2008).
  
18
  Kazoviyo and Nyaburerwa (2011) 
19
  Arrêté Conjoint No 121/VP1-VP2/006/2009 Portant Institutionalisation et Décentral-
isation de la Méthode des Résultats Rapides Comme Outil de Mise en Ouevre du 
Programme du Gouvernement, stating “the Rapid Results Approach would be institu-
tionalized and decentralized… that it will be applied in all ministries and public ser-
vices to support implementation of the PRSP…Within this framework each ministry 
will launch a new wave of RRIs each trimester… in line with the priorities of their 
sector” 
20
  World Bank, March 2011 
21
  World Bank, April 2011 
22
  Competitiveness and employment; Vulnerability and resilience; Governance and 
public sector capacity 
23
  "To sustain economic performance, we must demand greater efficiency, and we ex-
pect results from all sectors... In this regard, we have already motivated people to-
wards improved accountability, planning and performance using the Rapid Results 
Approach. We are confident that this improved performance is proof that sound 
management means the needs of the public become reality". Pierre Nkurunziza, Pres-
ident of the Republic of Burundi, 14th February 2011 during the Belgian Week in 
Bujumbura, a yearly event aiming to promote trade and investment between Burundi 
and its main economic partner, Association de Reflexion et d’Information sur le Bu-
rundi, February 2011. 
24
  World Bank/IFC (2012) World Bank and IFC, Doing Business Economy Profile 
2012: Burundi 
25
  The state electricity company in Burundi, which sits under the Ministry of Energy, 
Water and Mining 
26
  Although the published ranking in the 2012 Doing Business report, this was adjusted 
in the 2013 Doing Business Economy Profile for Burundi in 2012 to 172. This was 
necessary to reflect the fact that two economies (Barbados and Malta) were added to 
the DB sample that year. 
27
  World Bank and International Finance Corporation, Doing Business in the East Afri-
ca Community 2012 
28  
Cabinet of the President, Government of Burundi, December 2011
 
29
  Cabinet of the President, Government of Burundi, December 2011 
30
  Cabinet of the President, Government of Burundi, December 2011 
31
  The number of RRIs implemented began to decrease in 2011 and continued in 2012 
as the program transitioned to the ‘institutionalization’ phase whereby WBI began 
slowly withdrawing financial and coaching support, and the National School of Ad-
ministration began to take over the role of training and providing coaches.  
32
  This is true even in non-democratic regimes (see Campos and Root, 1994) 
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33
  See for instance, Matta and Ashkenas (2003). 
34
  For example, in an RRI focusing on the distribution of textbooks from a warehouse 
in the capital city to schools in the provinces, a wide variety of actors were necessary 
at all levels to complete the chain of delivery. This included Ministry of Education 
officials at the central government level, the Governor of the Province, the Provincial 
Education Directors, members of the Parent Teacher Association. In another example 
– the accelerated payment of teachers – this required working across ministries: the 
Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Civil Service to accelerate the communi-
cation and processing of recruitment files which were initiated in the Ministry of Ed-
ucation, but which the process of hiring was undertaken within the MCS. 
35
  Field interviews (Bujumbura, December 2011). 
36
 The role of a coach is best described metaphorically. Imagine having to teach your 
five-year-old daughter to ride a bicycle. You, the coach, can describe to her what it 
takes to ride and control a bike, noting the function of the steering rod and the 
brakes. But for her to learn, she needs to get onto a bike and actually learn how to 
ride, which means falling down, getting scratches and wounds, and maybe even suf-
fering sprains. On your part, to help her learn more quickly, you can push the bike 
fast enough so that she begins to sense that more speed will help keep her from fall-
ing down. You can then mention to her that if she pedals faster, the bike will speed 
up, and then encourage her to try that. Once she has learned this then the next chal-
lenge is how to get onto the bike and generate enough speed. There are many differ-
ent ways to do this and each individual will eventually discover his or her preferred 
style. Your role, as the coach, is to observe her and suggest alternatives that might 
work better for her. 
37
  Based on reports from Burundi national Coaches 
38
  See for instance, Ariely (2013) and Dewhurst, Guthridge and Mohr (2009) 
39
  See Schaffer et al (2005). 
40
  Field interview (Bujumbura, December 2011). 
41
  See World Bank Institute (2013) 
42
  Future L4Rs will utilize the Outcome Harvesting methodology to assess the effec-
tiveness of and introduce improvements to the program. 
43
  Since 2011, L4Rs have been launched in several countries: Sierra Leone, Madagas-
car, Comoros, Malawi, Indonesia, Iraq, Philippines, Cameroon. 
44
  For more extensive programs, two or more RRA coaches may be needed but typical 
programs involve only one coach, either international or local. Part of the task of the 
RRA coach is to train a member of a client RRI team (called an internal coach) in 
coaching so that he or she can gradually take on an increasing role in supporting the 
team further down the line (and likewise be deployed to help other teams). Internal 
coaches receive enough training to do rudimentary coaching; with more experience, 
they can work their way to being national/local coaches and eventually international 
caliber coaches. The World Bank Institute has established a coach training and certi-
fication program for the latter. 
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45
  Based on delivery to date, the average annual cost of the Burundi Leadership pro-
gram has been $188,843 (including consultant fees, travel costs and all other variable 
costs). The total cost of the program from 2006 – 2012 for seven years of implemen-
tation support was $1,321,906 ($1,039,676 in trust funds and $282, 224 in Bank 
Budget, including staff time, World Bank Institute cost data). 
46
  “In 12 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the extreme poverty rate (living on less than 
$1.25 a day) is above 60%, and in 4 countries, it is above 80%”. World Bank, The 
World Bank Group Goals: End Extreme Poverty and Promote Shared Prosperity, 
2013. Examples in 2010: Madagascar 81.3%, Nigeria 68%, Malawi 61.6% of the 
populations were living on less than $1.25 per day. Data available at: 
http://data.worldbank.org 
47
  See for instance GIZ’s Capacity Works Program, 
http://www.giz.de/en/ourservices/1544.html 
48
  See Swidler and Watkins (2009) on the concept and practice of Small Development. 
49
  Schneider (2013) 
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APPENDIX I: THE RAPID RESULTS APPROACH 
The Rapid Results Approach (RRA) was developed by the private sector in the U.S. 
for the private sector to support improved performance and shareholder value and has 
been proven to strengthen implementation capacity, accelerate the achievement of con-
crete results, and introduce a culture of results for those organizations that use it. It is a 
methodology of good management techniques drawing on theory and principles of 
change, which has been used by Schaffer Consulting for the past 50 years to facilitate 
change within organizations. It unleashes creativity and capacity, accelerates learning 
from years to 100 days and introduces basic management disciplines that allow efforts 
to succeed. It has been adapted to the developing country context for application within 
government ministries and is customized to each specific country situation. It has prov-
en to be highly instrumental in changing attitudes, behaviors, and processes and, most 
critically, it has allowed governments through the ‘demonstration effect’ of successful 
service delivery projects to enhance their credibility amongst citizens. Its success de-
pends heavily upon the commitment and engagement of leaders to explore new ways of 
doing business – with a unique focus on the attainment of concrete results while devel-
oping capacity through ‘learning-by-doing’. 
Rapid Results Initiatives (RRIs) are “small projects designed to quickly deliver mini-
versions of the big project’s end results”.1 RRIs are the engine that drives the RRA. 
RRIs support project implementation through a series of highly choreographed 100-day 
initiatives that produce highly ambitious and tangible results that can be leveraged to 
contribute to larger-scale reform/change processes. They are structured, team-based 
projects that are focused on results. In the short-term they are designed to release group 
adrenalin by launching action on a real challenge with a very ambitious goal. They are 
designed and owned by the team, and ideally, once achieved, will produce very tangible 
results within 100 days. In the longer-term, efforts are sustained and built upon, leading 
to new ways of working, stimulated innovation, more collaborative team work, and be-
havior changes within the team and, ultimately, the organization. Each project is com-
pleted within a short - and fixed - period of time, usually around 100 days, and is facili-
tated by a coach trained in implementing RRIs. At the outset, the RRI team establishes 
in a specific and measurable manner a stretch result, then undertakes the planning and 
monitoring of the initiative, and each team member effectively implements the required 
elements tasked to him or her to achieve the RRI goal. 
Each RRI team has between 6 to 10 people who feel a real sense of accountability to 
perform at a higher level. Team members are identified and selected as being those who 
have a vested interest in the success of the RRI, as well as those whose collaboration 
will be required to make it a success. This normally includes cross-department, or cross-
ministerial team membership, as often accomplishments are not possible working only 
within the realm of one department/ministry but require cross-support in completing the 
chain of actors to alleviate any potential systemic blockages. In addition, it is highly 
                                                 
1
 See Matta and Ashkenas (2003). 
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beneficial to have as team members the intended beneficiaries of the desired RRI goal 
as this informs the design and execution of the RRI. 
The team has a clear and compelling statement of what will be achieved – involving a 
result with a real impact, not an activity or an enabler. They have a work plan with steps 
to achieve the goal, involving experimenting with new strategies, ideas, or processes, or 
new ways of doing the same things. In essence, an RRI team is a temporary governance 
structure that undertakes an experimental process which includes team leaders, team 
members, a team coach, a monitoring and tracking system, weekly progress status up-
dates, mid-course reflection and evaluation, and sustainability plans. 
The main steps in implementing a Rapid Results Initiative (RRI) are: 
SHAPING PHASE 
1. Framing the Focus: 
 Identifying a key champion to drive and oversee the reform process; 
 Clarification of the overall policies and strategies in which the RRI will be sit-
uated;  
 Assessing readiness to act and assuring commitment and engagement of high-
est level of leadership; 
 Definition of focus areas where priority and tangible results are expected; 
 Identifying an appropriate local sponsor of the RRIs. This person can, for ex-
ample, be the Minister of the relevant ministry under which the RRI will be 
launched. The sponsor is normally a person whose role is: (i) to identify the 
priority area of strategic importance to which RRIs may contribute; (ii) devel-
op the initial strategy; (iii) to help people learn, develop skills, and exercise 
leadership all along the RRI cycle; (iv) to review the results of the RRI team at 
the final review session, and (v) begin to lay out plans for the next steps.  
 Identifying a Strategic Leader for the RRI. This person can be, for example, a 
Deputy Minister of or a Director General within the relevant ministry in which 
the RRI(s) will be launched. The Strategic Leader is normally a person whose 
role is: (i) to identify the desired outcome (within the priority areas identified 
by the sponsor) to which the RRI will contribute; (ii) to be an initial point of 
contact for supporting the RRI team (including freeing up resources) and alle-
viating blockages to their success; (iii) to mobilize and influence actors con-
cerned by the RRI throughout the RRI cycle; (iv) to review the results of the 
RRI team at the mid-point and final reviews; (v) to collaborate with the spon-
sor on how the RRI team may move ahead in the next cycle and facilitate a 
smoother work environment for them to succeed, based upon lessons learnt 
from the previous RRI cycle; 
 Affirmation that the RRI goal will generate a result which will contribute to 
the attainment of the desired outcomes of these policies and strategies. 
2. Orientation and Prioritization Work-Shop: A large group of stakeholders are 
brought together to agree upon initial priority areas for action in which RRIs 
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may be useful to jumpstart implementation and accelerate achievement of re-
sults. The areas identified by these stakeholders are ideally those around which 
there is a readiness and urgency to act and improve upon the current situation 
(what keeps them awake at night?). 
3. Training of Rapid Results Coaches: A workshop to train local rapid results 
coaches. The local coaches support rapid results teams on the process of ap-
plying the principles of Rapid Results. 
4. Orientation work sessions: These sessions are designed to help Rapid Results 
team leaders and strategic leaders to think strategically on how RRIs can con-
tribute to the achievement of the overarching policies and strategies, and to 
decide upon priority areas for which RRIs can show initial concrete results. 
This is a necessary prior step to the launch workshop in terms of providing 
guidance to RRI teams during the launch workshop when they will design 
their RRI goal and work-plan. It helps ensure alignment between overarching 
strategies and desired outcomes, and the goal of the RRI team as a smaller part 
contributing to their achievement. 
IMPLEMENTATION PHASE 
5. Workshop to Launch Rapid Results Initiatives: The Rapid Results team leader 
and members identify their 100-day RRI goals that are aligned with the strate-
gic goal stated in the challenge note, and develop their work plans to accom-
plish these goals. The launch is the event which marks the effective start date 
of the RRI. The RRI goal fixed by the team and aligned with priorities defined 
by leaders, must be challenging but achievable, clearly specified, measurable, 
meaningful value for the beneficiaries. Most of all the team must be excited 
and proud, be prepared to work very hard and solve problems rather than suc-
cumbing to them. The work plan outlines the respective responsibilities of 
each team member. 
6. Progress Management and Monitoring: The team must ensure that it executes 
its work plan, and so it implements monitoring mechanisms which allow it to 
adjust its actions, if necessary, either in terms of operations between the team 
members, or in terms of more complex matters such as milestones towards the 
RRI goal, or revision of the RRI goal itself. It is more common to revise the 
work-plan and milestones, however, if the RRI goal is revised it is done under 
the approval of the strategic leader (and usually at the mid-term review). Tools 
such as tracking charts, individual follow-ups by the coach and team meetings 
are introduced and utilized to assist in monitoring progress. 
7. Reviews: Mid-Term and Final: The reviews constitute major events at which 
the progress of the RRI team towards achievement of their RRI goals are re-
viewed by the Strategic Leader and sponsor. These events are also, and almost 
more importantly, an opportunity to review the changes and improvements in 
work methods, communications and team behaviors that may have been fos-
tered through operating under a new culture of focusing upon results and 
which have been adopted during the RRI process. This is significant in terms 
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of changes within individual team members, within RRI teams, and over time 
can have implications for positive changes at the institutional level. 
SCALING-UP – INSTITUTIONALIZATION PHASE 
Scaling Up: If the government judges the initial set of pilot initiatives as valuable, the 
process can be scaled up within a sector, across sectors, or sub-nationally, whichever is 
relevant. If scaling up is to succeed, top-level engagement is a necessary condition. In 
some countries this takes the form of a formal endorsement of the approach from the 
head of state as a demonstration of his commitment to achieving results on national pri-
orities. In other countries it takes the form of a decree from the council of ministers, or 
even the setting up of a special cross-ministerial unit, sometimes in the presidency. 
In all cases the appointment of a steering group at the ministerial, head of organization 
level (sometimes represented by proxies) is an important step for sustained operational 
effectiveness. Their role is to endorse initiatives, monitor implementation status across 
multiple initiatives, address critical obstacles and share innovative solutions. Most im-
portantly, they are expected to appraise the head of state of key breakthroughs and im-
portant institutional changes taking place. To expand interest, they can sponsor work-
shops to share lessons across ministries, which in many contexts have proven to be con-
siderably valuable. 
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APPENDIX II: SAMPLE RAPID RESULTS INITIATIVES (MID 2007 – MID 2011) 
Ministry Key Indicator 
Target 
Stretch Result 
Actual Result 
Primary and Seconda-
ry Education 
Textbooks distributed to primary schools 25,000 in one 
year 
25,000 in 60 
days 
Health Pregnant women who visited health centers 
and undertook an HIV/AIDS screening 
71 in one 
month 
482 in one 
month 
Civil Service New teachers receiving their first pay-
check in six provinces 
1500 in one 
year 
1500 in three 
months 
National Solidarity Refugees voluntarily returned from Tanza-
nia 
2,500 per 
month 
22,756 in 4 
months 
Health People treated with Anti-Retroviral medica-
tion for HIV/AIDS in Karuzi district 
0 80 in 5 months 
National Defence and 
Former Combatants  
Displaced families in military camps now 
relocated towards their home territories 
0 since civil 
war in 1993 
995 
Commerce Increase in non-traditional exports such as 
fruits, vegetables and flowers 
0 Tonnes 30 Tonnes in 4 
months 
Land Settlement, 
Tourism, and the 
Environment 
Land on the Mubone hill protected from 
erosion 
29.4 hectares 
in 7 months 
29.4 hectares 
in 4 months 
Land Settlement, 
Tourism, and the 
Environment 
New seedlings planted 71,000 in 7 
months 
71,000 in 4 
months  
Department of 
Transport, Mail and 
Telecommunications 
Lines of public transport established be-
tween three regions 
0 3 lines in 100 
days 
Agriculture and Farm-
ing 
Anti-erosion hedges planted in the Mu-
ramvya province to reduce land erosion 
200km in 7 
months 
200km in 4 
months 
Civil Service System established for the faster payment 
of first salary pay-checks to newly recruited 
civil servants (scale up of RRI on payment 
of teachers)  
6 – 12 months  60 days  
National Solidarity Refugees returned voluntarily between 
March and June 2008  
22,800 in 3 
months 
40,138 in 3 
months 
National Solidarity Trainers trained in human rights in districts 
that have a high number of returned refu-
gees and displaced persons 
0 182 in 100 
days 
Vice-Ministry for 
Planning 
2009-2011 Public Investment Programme 
(PIP) drafted prior to annual budget 
- PIP never 
produced be-
fore the annual 
budget previ-
ously 
Vice-Ministry for 
Planning 
New database drawn from the Institute of 
Statistics and Economic Studies in Burun-
di (ISTEEBU) and the Bank of Burundi 
(BRB) created and now operational 
Project stuck 
for 4 years  
Database final-
ized in 6 
months  
Health HIV/AIDS positive individuals received 
treatment in Rumonge 
50 in 100 days 87 in 100 days 
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Permanent Secretariat 
of the National Com-
mittee for the Coordi-
nation of Assistance 
Automated database established to provide 
information on support provided by all 
NGOs in Burundi (previously manual sys-
tem used) 
Project stuck 
for 3 years  
85% comple-
tion within 6 
months  
Environment Young trees weeded in 11 wooded sites to 
avoid destruction by weeds and rodents 
Previously no 
monitoring 
done after 
plantation 
180,000 in 
99days 
Environment Newly planted trees and weeding to stop 
erosion caused by flooding from the 
Nyamabuye 
0 in previously 
untouched 
areas 
745,100 in 90 
days  
Agriculture and Farm-
ing 
Bank areas that have undergone ditch 
cleaning to stop land erosion due to flood-
ing 
0 in previously 
untouched 
areas 
850 in 90days 
Agriculture and Farm-
ing 
Anti-erosion hedges planted in Gitega and 
Rutana to reduce land erosion 
3 meters per 
worker per day 
6 meters per 
worker per day  
Justice Time taken for court judgments to be made 
available 
4 days 1 day 
Finance Persons trained in the application of the 
new procurement law 
0 persons trai-
ned 
100 persons in 
30 days 
Public Health and 
AIDS Prevention 
Increased the number of blood donations in 
Bubanza and Bujumbura 
500 bags coll-
ected 
2336 bags 
collected 
East African Commu-
nity 
Reduced monthly consumption of water in 
the central administration of the ministry to 
save ministry funds 
54,200 Burun-
di Francs per 
month 
19,615 Burun-
di Francs 
Public Safety Reduced the time for the issuance of a 
driver’s license throughout the country  
14 days 5 days 
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APPENDIX III: BURUNDI LEADERSHIP FOR RESULTS: THE EVOLVING CHARACTER OF 
RRIS 
Period End 2006 - Mid 2008 
 
Mid 2008 – Mid 2010 Mid 2010 - 2011 
Focus of interven-
tion 
Targeting specific initia-
tives related to short term 
priorities 
Fostering sustainability and 
alignment within a medium 
term strategic framework 
 
Stimulating behavioral 
change within the pub-
lic administration 
Examples in 
HEALTH 
Rate of detecting HIV 
AIDS among pregnant 
women increased from 3% 
to 10% in 60 days 
 
The number of provincial 
sites of antiretroviral thera-
py for HIV AIDS increased 
from 74 to 105 
 
 
 
 
Administrative stand-
ards and norms: Operat-
ing expenses (phone, 
electricity, water, fuel) 
were reduced by 30% 
on average while main-
taining the same quality 
of service within 100 
days in many ministries. 
Examples in 
EDUCATION 
25,000 textbooks distrib-
uted to remote places in 
60 days (vs. books lan-
guishing in warehouses in 
the capital city for nine 
months) 
 
Over 200,000 textbooks and 
school supplies were dis-
tributed before the begin-
ning of the school year 
across the country 
Examples in 
ENVIRONMENT 
Seedlings needed to refor-
est 30 ha (75 acres) pro-
duced in 100 days 
 
More than 300 ha (750 
acres) were reforested and 
mountain ridges constructed 
to protect against erosion (6 
meters per day per person 
through RRI instead of 
“Food for Work”; before 
accomplished only 3 meters 
per day per person through 
the “Food for Work” pro-
gram) 
 
Examples in 
PUBLIC SEC-
TOR 
Time taken to receive first 
pay-checks for newly 
recruited public teachers 
in remote areas reduced 
from 1+ year to 6 months 
after a 100-day RRI 
 
Salaries for newly recruited 
civil servants (including 
public school teachers) 
were paid within 60 days 
after receipt of applications 
 
 
Other examples   Utilities: Delays in 
connecting electricity 
and water were reduced 
from 100 to 30 days 
after a 100-day RRI; 
The Courts: Delays in 
processing cases were 
reduced from 6 to 3 
months in the various 
court offices within 100 
days; 
Transport: Deadline for 
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Period End 2006 - Mid 2008 
 
Mid 2008 – Mid 2010 Mid 2010 - 2011 
issuing driver’s licenses 
was reduced from 15 to 
5 days across the coun-
try, after a 100-day 
RRI; 
 
Source: RRI teams Final Review Reports from 2006 to 2011, harvested by the national coach 
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APPENDIX IV: WHAT IT MEANS TO BE AN RRA COACH 
The fundamental role of the coach is to guide the Strategic Leader and RRI Team Lead-
ers in maximizing team performance, while sustaining the morale of team members and 
facilitating problem-solving to continue implementation until the RRI goal is met. 
Initially, the coach assists the Strategic Leader in the identification of a desired outcome 
in an area of strategic importance and urgency to the overarching unit inside which the 
RRI team operates (usually a government ministry), and towards which (s)he would 
support the RRI team to contribute. The coach then works with the RRI team leader and 
individual team members to set an RRI goal that will contribute to, and be in clear 
alignment with, the desired outcome of the Strategic Leaders. This process involves also 
determining the “readiness” of individual team members who will be responsible for 
executing actions to deliver on this RRI goal. Establishing “readiness” requires drilling-
down from what people describe initially to be the ‘obvious’ problem, to the underlying 
challenges and reasons on why it remains a problem. It also requires facilitation of a 
discussion around what people really care about, and what they are really inspired (and 
thus ready) to act upon. The coach plays a critical role in this initial preparation phase, 
which is known as the shaping phase. (S)he then proceeds with the teams to launch their 
initiative – beginning the implementation phase. 
Throughout the duration of implementing the RRI, the coach remains a constant source 
of support and guidance. (S)he is a guardian of the methodology ensuring its norms and 
principles are respected, helps facilitate effective communication between the team 
members, with their Strategic Leader, and with other RRI teams. This requires organiz-
ing regular meetings, phone calls and individual follow-ups. 
The coach also prepares for and facilitates the required public events throughout the 
RRI cycle, including the mid-term review and the final review sessions. Following the 
mid-term review, the coach assists with any course corrections or adjustments necessary 
in the work-plan or even on the RRI goal itself, based upon experiences throughout the 
first half of the RRI cycle. 
To maximize the value of an RRI, the coach works with the RRI teams and leaders to-
wards planning the sustainability and/or expansion of the results, based upon their expe-
riences throughout the implementation of the RRI. Based upon this, (s)he then facili-
tates discussion and a process of decision-making at the strategic leadership level to 
create a buy-in and an authorizing environment to move forward with these plans for 
sustainability and/or expansion. The coach also introduces discussion around institu-
tionalizing lessons learned from obstacles faced in policies, processes, communications 
and perverse incentives skewing the RRI implementation environment. The aim of these 
discussions being to identify what may be adjusted and acted upon to improve the insti-
tutional environment for the next cycle of RRIs. 
In sum, the coach takes on five key functions: 
 Transferring knowledge and techniques on the theory and operationaliza-
tion of the RRA and good project management techniques to team leaders and 
team members throughout the duration of the RRI; 
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 Bolstering amongst team leaders and members a sense of urgency to achieve 
the goal and a readiness to act; 
 Maintaining the momentum for action and the morale of the team leaders 
and members to continue implementing and confronting challenges through-
out the duration of the RRI; 
 Facilitating a continual flow of knowledge and communication 
 between team members and Strategic Leaders to highlight to leaders where 
they may step in to help alleviate challenges/blockages where needed, as well 
as 
 between different RRI teams to identify common challenges they may act in 
unity to confront, and to share innovations and lessons learnt;  
Providing methodological advice to the advisors and strategic leaders to help them 
pilot the selection and implementation of the portfolio of RRIs in alignment with the 
institutions’ overall development goal. 
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